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Abstract
Cordova is a town of approximately 2,000 people located on the southern coast of Alaska. 
A power grid for a town this size, with a large seasonal fishing economy, is considered a mod­
erate to large sized microgrid in terms of power produced. Understanding the vulnerabilities 
and risks of failures in such a grid is important for planning and operations and investigating 
these characteristics in the context of complex system dynamics is novel. The analysis of 
Cordova's microgrid is a case study relevant to a large class of microgrid communities that 
could benefit from this work. Our analysis of this grid began by looking at the distribution of 
all outages from 2003 - 2017 by size, followed by splitting up outages based on certain char­
acteristics and again looking at outage size distribution based on different characteristics. 
Following this we correlated the outages with different weather patterns and then with the 
hourly load demand on the system. After doing these analyses we developed a risk metric to 
give a single numerical value to the risk of an outage occurring during certain time periods 
and under certain conditions. We looked at risk in the summer versus the winter due to the 
summer having a much larger load demand, and we also looked at the risk before and after 
all cables in the grid were buried underground. This gives us an idea of when/under what 
circumstances the most outages are likely to occur and allows us to run our model of the 
system, make changes, and determine if those changes were beneficial to the system or not.
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1 General Introduction
This pro ject was done in order to analyze the resiliency of the power grid in the town of 
Cordova, AK. Cordova is a case study of a large class of microgrid communities/situations 
that could benefit from this work. Cordova is a town of approximately 2,000 people located 
on the southern coast of Alaska. Being a coastal town, it has a large fishing economy. 
Cordova's power grid is considered a microgrid, but is a moderate to large sized microgrid. 
There are a total of about 1,600 meters, 600 nodes, and 600 lines in this grid. There are 
3 generation stations, two of which use hydro power and the third generation station uses 
diesel power. Through this pro ject we aim to investigate conditions that may lead to a higher 
chance of an outage occurring on the grid. Then, we will use this information to create a 
risk metric for the system. This risk metric can then be used to improve the strength of 
the grid against potential causes of outages. To create a risk metric for the grid we need 
to first define risk and then we can evaluate the size of the risk to the grid during different 
conditions. Risk will be defined though a combination of cost to the community, which will 
depend on the size of an outage, and the probability that a certain condition will lead to an 
outage. In order to do our analysis and develop a risk metric we were given access to the 
last 15 years' worth of outage data as well as the last 13 years' worth of power usage data 
by the town from the Cordova Electric Cooperative (CEC).
We used the data given to us to first analyze the outages alone to look for characteristics 
of this grid behaving like a complex system, something that is seen often in larger power 
grids. To do this we had to come up with a way to measure the size of an outage. We were 
given the duration of each outage in minutes and the number of meters that were down on 
each feeder during an outage. We used these two measures of outage size separately along 
with a measure of size that included both of these measures multiplied together. We then 
came up with another measure that calculated the approximated energy demand that went 
unserved due to the outage. We interpreted the multiplied values measure and the energy 
unserved measure as being better, more encompassing measures of outage size than just the 
number of meters affected or the duration of an outage alone.
Once we developed our measures of sizes of outages, we used a variety of statistical 
methods to analyze the outages in order to get a well-rounded interpretation of the data. To 
better visualize the distribution of outages throughout the 15 years we first plotted a time 
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series using each of the four measures described above. Beyond this nice visual representation 
we then sorted and grouped outages by size and plotted them as PDFs, CDFs, and CCDFs 
to see if a power law exists among the outages. If a power law does show up and the slope 
is between 0 and -1 that will indicate that larger outages are playing a higher role than 
just randomly being scattered throughout. This is significant because it would indicate that 
the system may be displaying characteristics of a complex system. We use these techniques 
throughout the analysis in order to get an idea of how big of a role the larger outages play 
in the system compared to the smaller, more frequent outages. We also performed an r/s 
analysis on our two main measures of outage size to look at any long time correlations of 
the outages in the grid.
The outage data also included cause codes that told us what category the cause of an 
outage fell into. Because of this we were able to look separately at planned and unplanned 
outages as well as look at which specific causes were the most common. Looking at causes 
individually made it possible to analyze whether or not there was a particular cause of 
outages that may have led to a disproportionate amount of larger outages, outages during a 
certain time of day or period in the year, etc. To do this, we again used PDFs and compared 
the slopes of each outage cause's plot.
Once we got an idea of the distribution of outages alone based on their sizes and causes 
we began correlating and comparing these outages with other factors. The main factors 
we looked at were weather conditions and the cycle of power demand. When looking at 
weather conditions we looked for correlations with both extreme weather events along with 
everyday weather. For example, we looked at outages that corresponded with high wind 
events, flooding, and heavy snowfall and also correlated outages with daily temperature and 
daily precipitation values. When looking at the cycle of power demand we noticed a day and 
night cycle as well as a very consistent, very large spike in power demand in the summer. 
Since this is a coastal town with a large fishing economy it makes sense to us that this 
summertime peak is due to the high power demand coming from the fish processing plants, 
which only operate during the summer. Because of this large seasonal difference in power 
demand we focus a lot of our analysis of the outages correlated with load demand by splitting 
it up into two seasons, summer vs winter, and comparing the distribution of outages that 
occur during each season. We look also at day vs night, but since this difference is not nearly 
as drastic as the seasonal change we don't focus as much on it.
To analyze the differences in the seasonal and the daily cycles we looked at the probability 
of an outage occurring during a certain time in the load demand cycle. For example, for 
summer we totaled up all outages that occurred between mid-June to mid-September every 
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year and divided that by total number of outages. We did the same for winter and the same 
for day and night. Once we got these percentages we were able to compare these values 
with the percentage of an outage randomly occurring during these times. If the percentages 
were similar that would mean the outages are likely randomly occurring during this time. 
However if the first percentage is a significant amount higher that would indicate that there 
is something happening during a specific time period to cause more outages than one would 
expect. In this case we would expect that that something would have to do with the load 
demand cycle. We did this for overall outages that occurred during these times and then we 
went further and split the outages up in terms of small, medium, and large outages. We did 
this using the outage size measures of energy that went unserved, number of meters down 
times duration in minutes, and just duration in minutes. We chose to do this analysis for 
all of these measures because we thought that each one could tell us different important 
information. The results from these different measures of size could also be compared to 
determine if they were all consistent or if a certain measure produced vastly different results. 
Both situations in this case can tell us something about the behavior of the outages.
We were also told that in 2009 all of the lines were buried underground. While we 
assumed the burial of these lines might not help internal causes of outages, like load demand 
being too high, we figured that this would likely cause some external factors such as high 
wind storms to have much less of an effect of the grid. In order to see just how much this 
change helped the grid we split up and analyzed outages before 2009 and after to see if there 
was a difference in the distribution of the sizes of the outages. We combined this with the 
seasonal power demand change as well and looked at the differences in outages that occurred 
in the summer vs the winter before and after 2009 to see if this burial had a different effect 
on different times in the load demand cycle. We also looked at our risk metric before and 
after 2009 and in summer vs winter to get an idea of if the burial of the lines reduced the 
overall risk on the system.
After all of this we have a good idea of the outages and how they are distributed among 
season, time of day, and before or after the lines were buried. We use these factors to 
compare risk values. As described above, risk is defined though a combination of cost to 
the community, the probability that an outage will occur during the certain time period, 
and the frequency that outages normally appear during the certain time period. We will use 
this information to get a single value that we will call the risk index for each different time 
period. There is no scale to this risk value, but it is used rather as a comparison. If a risk 
index is higher for one season than the other that will indicate that there is more risk to the 
system during the season with the higher risk index. Furthermore, the farther apart the two 
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risk indices are, the greater the difference of risk in the two time periods. These risk indices 
give a simple yet accurate representation of when the grid may be least or most likely to 
suffer from an outage. This is useful because they can be used to indicate points in the grid 
that may need the most attention the next time improvements are made and what points of 
the grid are already the strongest.
All of these processes and analysis methods listed here and the results from these are 
described in more detail in the following chapters.
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2 Risk Analysis of Cordova's Microgrid From 
a Complex Systems Viewpoint 1
2.1 Background
1 Prepared for submission. Authors: Anna Lipetzky Bowker, Dr. David Newman, Cordova Electric 
Cooperative
In order to create a more reliable power grid, it is important to look at outage causes 
and patterns that exist on the current grid. This has been done in depth on large power 
grids [1]-[17], but less so in microgrids. A grid that can be used to analyze microgrids is 
the Cordova grid. To do this sort of analysis for the town of Cordova, data on all outages 
and average hourly load demand for the town was provided to us by the Cordova Electric 
Cooperative. The data given looks at outages for the past 15 years (from 2003-2017) and 
the hourly load demand for the past 13 years (from 2005-2017). We analyze the outage data 
by itself first to get an idea of the system and then we compare and contrast this outage 
data to certain external factors that may influence outages, such as severe weather events or 
fluctuating customer demand. In the end, we use all of these analyses in order to create a 
risk metric for the system, similar to what was done in [17]-[18].
We start off in the first analysis sub-section using the outage size information to analyze 
characteristics and behaviors of the microgrid in this town, namely looking to see if it exhib­
ited complex system dynamics. We see that some larger grids analyzed prior to this show 
power laws when looking at the distribution of the outage sizes [1]-[17]. The fact that power 
laws exist in the data and slopes of these power laws being between -1 and zero can tell us 
about the underlying dynamics in the system. When a power law exists, this suggests that 
the grid may be a complex system. The shallower the slope is in the power law means that 
the large events are occurring more frequently than we would expect and thus will play a 
dominating role when assessing blackout risk.
After investigating the characteristics of the microgrid's overall outage data by itself we 
look deeper into the causes of the outages. We look at individual causes of these outages in 
order to see if there is a particular cause or type of cause that is leading to a disproportionate 
number of outages. We then break down the outages further and look at the size distribution 
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of outages from some of the ma jor causes to see if there is a cause that is associated with 
more large or small outages compared to normal.
Because the Cordova grid is small enough to be contained in a single town, we can 
obtain weather history for this town and compare certain weather events to the outages. 
These weather events include blizzards, floods, and high wind storms. We also look at daily 
weather data such as precipitation, snowfall, and average temperature and correlate these 
events with the outages to look for any trends or periodicities.
Finally, we compare the outages with the hourly load demand. We see daily and yearly 
fluctuations in the load and analyze how this affects outages. We look deeper into outage 
size to determine if there is a certain time in the load demand cycles that cause more large 
or small outages than average.
2.2 Data
The data used for this project is all relevant to analyze the electric grid for the town of 
Cordova. The specific information relating directly to the power grid is provided to us by 
the Cordova Electric Cooperative. Any other information relating to the town of Cordova 
can be found online.
The first data we looked at was a summary of the outages that occurred within the 
power grid from the years 2003-2017. This information included the time of each outage, the 
duration, the specific feeder it occurred on, how many meters were affected by the outage, and 
the cause of the outage (if known). Besides when we are specifically analyzing the different 
feeders, it is assumed that outages that occur at the same time, for the same duration, and 
with the same cause, but on different feeders, are the same outage and are combined into 
one in the analysis.
When looking through the outage data we noticed a few outages that appeared to be 
cascading failures. We counted the failure as cascading if a second (or more) failure occurred 
on another feeder before the first was fixed and if the cause of the outage was unplanned. 
There were a total of 18 cascading failures from unplanned outages out of a total of 522 
unplanned outages for the 15 years. This gives us 3.4% of unplanned outages appearing to 
be cascading. A majority of the cascading failures were due to “Power Supplier - Hydro” 
and “Distribution - Primary Cable.”
While still looking at the outages, we then found data on the weather history in Cordova.
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This weather history included daily precipitation values, daily snowfall, daily current snow 
depth, floods, blizzards, and high wind events [19]-[20]. We looked at any similarities between 
when some of these stronger weather events occurred and when outages occurred.
Following this the load demand of the system was analyzed. We were given hour by hour 
load demand for each feeder for the years 2005-2017. This data consisted of an average of 
every second of the load demand over that hour in order to get a value for the specific hour. 
We were also given second by second data on the load generated in the system, split up 
by hydro power and by diesel power which could simply be combined to give total power 
generated. Because this was second by second data it was turned into hour by hour data 
both to match that given by the load demand data and because second by second data is 




The outages are analyzed in terms of size. There are four different measures for size: 
the duration of the outage in minutes, the number of meters downed/out by the outage, 
the duration multiplied by the number of meters out, and an estimate of the amount of 
energy that goes unserved due to an outage. The time series of outages in terms of the 
four different size measures can be seen below. Unless there is something of interest in the 
first two measures that differs greatly from the third, most of the analysis looks at the third 
measure - (meters out)x(duration) - and the fourth measure - amount of average power 
unserved during the outage times the duration of the outage (where every time duration 
is measured in minutes). The reasoning for this assumption is that these measures give a 
more complete picture of the size and impact of the outages. The assumption that (meters 
out)x(duration) is a better measure than each measure individually can be seen in the first 
three time series in figure 2.1
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Figure 2.1: Time Series of Outages Measured by (meters out)x(duration)
Figure 2.1 shows the plot of outages in terms of meters times duration. The outages vary 
greatly in size and the larger outages seem to be spread and not all near the same time. 
Figure 2.2 is the time series plot in terms of duration. This plot somewhat reaffirms the fact 
that sometimes just looking at duration does not give any information on the magnitude of 
the outages in terms of how many customers are affected. For instance, a shorter duration 
outage may have a larger impact if it takes out hundreds of meters than a longer duration 
outage would if it only affects a few meters. We can see this if we look at the largest outage 
in terms of duration that occurs in early 2005; from the duration plot below we can tell it 
was a very long outage, however from the meters times duration plot above the event is seen 
but does not have nearly the same impact because it only affected one meter.
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Figure 2.2: Time Series of Outages Measured by Duration in Minutes
Secondly, from the time series of the outages plotted in Figure 2.3 it becomes clear also 
that the number of meters out can be a limiting measure because different feeders get maxed 
out on certain distinct levels. These distinct levels seen are the total number of meters on 
each feeder, which gives a maximum value to how many meters can be affected by an outage 
on a particular feeder. The numbers of meters on each feeder are: Auxiliary - 104, 13 Mile 
- 226, Main Town - 317, Lake Avenue - 430, New Town - 517.
9
Figure 2.3: Time Series of Outages Measured by meters out
The duration of the outages and the number of meters out in each outage are straightfor­
ward measures and come right from the outage data. The energy unserved measure comes 
from the outage data in combination with the load demand data. To get the estimate of the 
size of an outage in terms of energy unserved we used the information from the load demand 
at a given time on the feeder that the outage occurred. Since there is no individual meter 
data, we assumed that all of the meters on a particular feeder used an equal amount of the 
total load on that feeder. The energy not served was calculated by:
Energy U nserved = meters × load × duration (2.1)
where,
meters = number of meters out on a f eeder
load = load per meter on that f eeder
duration = duration of the outage in minutes
Since the load demand value sometimes goes down while there is an outage we used the 
load value from the hour before the outage began plus the load value from the hour after 
the outage ended and divided by 2. Since this is feeder dependent the energy unserved was 
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calculated for each outage first and then the outages that occurred at the same time and for 
the same duration were combined.
In Figure 2.4 the time series for outages on the Lake Ave, New Town, Main Town, 13 
Mile, and Auxiliary feeders in terms of energy unserved are shown.
Figure 2.4: Time Series of Outages Measured by Energy Unserved
Even with the multiple assumptions made to calculate the estimate of the energy unserved 
we still have strong reason to believe this is the best measure for the size of an outage. This 
measure takes into account the duration of the outage, an estimate of how many customers 
the outage affected, and amount of power that is usually being consumed that is lost. This 
causes two outages that may have a similar duration and number of meters out to be sized 
differently depending on when during a load demand cycle they occur. This also means an 
outage during a peak demand time will hold more weight and be considered a larger outage. 
This discrepancy between two similar outages is beneficial because an outage that occurs 
during peak demand time will have the largest negative impact on customers.
When looking at the spread of the differently sized outages on the energy unserved and 
(meters out)x(duration) time series we notice there is a wide variety of outage sizes with 
small outages (and no outage) being by far the most common. While small outages are 
more common we do see large outages are occurring every one to two years and intermediate 
outages occurring at a rate somewhere in between the rate of small and large outages. This 
indicates that our system is showing characteristics of complex systems. Because of this, we 
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look deeper into the analyses done on complex systems, in particular, looking for power law 
behavior in a probability distribution function (PDF) of the outages.
2.3.1.2 Probability Distribution Function (PDF) and Complimentary Cumula­
tive Distribution Function (CCDF)
With the arrays of all outages using the four different measures of outage size we want to 
sort and group the different sizes of outages and plot them to determine the probability of 
having an outage of a particular size. This plot is called a probability distribution function 
(PDF) and can tell a lot about the system. In particular, we want to see if a power law 
occurs when these outages are sorted and grouped by size and then graphed on a log-log plot. 
To sort and group elements we want to put similar sized events together in the same bin and 
then each bin will be plotted with the average event size on the x -axis and the frequency 
that an event fell in that particular category on the y -axis. (The method for doing this is 
detailed in the appendix).
Once all outages are sorted and grouped in bins where every bin has a bin size and a 
frequency we plot bin size vs frequency on a log-log plot. This plot is the probability density 
function (PDF). If the plotted outages ever appear linear on this plot of the PDF this tells 
us that the data fits a power law. When a power law is present this indicates that large 
events occur more frequently than one would expect if outages were happening randomly, 
which would be shown in a plot by an exponential drop off. So it is the larger events that 
have a greater impact on the outages than the more frequent smaller events. Power laws can 
have varying slopes and the slope of this linear trend is also important. A shallower, less 
negative slope indicates that the larger events occur more frequently relative to the small 
event than with a steeper, more negative slope.
Looking at the PDF below in Figure 2.5 for all of the outages in terms of (meters 
out)x(duration) there is a power law. It occurs for events in the size range 25-26,000.
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Figure 2.5: PDF of Outages Measured by M eters Down × Duration in M inutes
The Complimentary Cumulative Distribution Function (CCDF) is another measure that 
can be calculated from the PDF. The CCDF is useful in that it shows the probability of 
having an event of a particular size or larger. This plot starts at one, indicating that there 
is a one hundred percent chance of an event being of the smallest size or larger. The CCDF 
is important because if a system is exhibiting a pure power law distribution then the CCDF 
will also show a power law which will have an exponent (slope on log-log plot) one greater 
than the exponent of the power law seen in the PDF.
There is a special version of the CCDF called the Survival Function. The survival function 
is the CCDF when there is only one event size per bin, n = 1 (i.e. only events ofthe same size 
are grouped together). This is a special case because it looks at each event size individually 
instead of getting probabilities for a group of events in a certain size range. For all outages 
measured by (meters out)x(duration) the CCDF and the survival function are shown in 
Figures 2.6 and 2.7.
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Figure 2.6: CCDF
Figure 2.7: Survival Function of Outages Measured by (meters out)x(duration)
Comparing the CCDF and the Survival Function above it can be seen that they have 
very similar shapes which would be expected. Despite the similar shapes there are still some 
slight differences because the Survival function takes into account all outage sizes instead of 
having bins with outage size ranges. Because of this there are some parts of the Survival 
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Function that become blurred or nonexistent in the plot of the CCDF.
We also look at the PDFs using the other two measures of size - duration in minutes 
and number of meters out by the outage. Looking at these two PDFs as well can give us 
information like the relative importance that long or short outages have. Both plots are 
shown below in Figures 2.8 and 2.9.
Figure 2.8: PDFs of Outages Measured by Duration in Minutes
Figure 2.9: PDFs of Outages Measured by meters out
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Because there is a power law in both plots we can see that larger events play a bigger 
role in the outages than one would expect if the outages were random. The steeper slope in 
the duration PDF tells us that these larger duration events are less common than the larger 
events in terms of the number of meters out, which has a shallower slope to its power law.
There are a number of outliers on the large event side when looking at the PDF of the 
number of meters out in each event. The original PDF with n = 10 can be seen above. We 
think these outliers may be caused by the fact that each feeder only has a certain number 
of meters associated with it and once all of those meters are down the event size cannot get 
any bigger. This will result in a disproportionate number of events of these sizes. These 
maximum values/total number of meters on each feeder are: Auxiliary - 104, 13 Mile - 226, 
Main Town - 317, Lake Avenue - 430, New Town - 517. We removed the events where 
all meters on the feeder were affected and analyzed the remaining 297 events. This caused 
the outliers to disappear, and so we believe the outages that effected all of the meters on a 
feeder were what caused outliers in the PDF. This filtering also caused a steeper and more 
accurate looking line of best fit. The filtered PDF is shown in Figure 2.10.
Figure 2.10: PDF of Outages Measured by Meters Out After Removing the Outages that 
Take Out All Meters on a Feeder
Looking at the PDF of the outages in terms of the energy unserved, shown in Figure 2.11, 
there is also a power law. This power law has a nearly identical slope as the plot shown in 
Figure 2.10 using the measure of (meters out)x(duration). From this we can see consistency 
in our two main measures of the outage size.
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Figure 2.11: PDF of Outages Measured by Energy Unserved
Because of the difference in load demand in the summer versus the winter (see analysis 
section e.) it is useful to analyze outages in terms of these seasons. Separating outages 
into summer vs winter and estimating energy not served in the same manner as before, we 
plotted the PDFs for both summer (June 15 - Sept 15) and winter (the rest of the year) 
(Figure 2.12 and 2.13). The slope for summer was -0.704 and winter has a slope of -0.923. 
This means there is a higher amount of larger outages in the summer when the load demand 
is higher.
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Figure 2.12: PDFs of Outages Measured by Energy Unserved During Summer
Figure 2.13: PDFs of Outages Measured by Energy Unserved During Winter
We notice power laws in our data in every different measure we use to quantify the sizes 
of our outages. This strongly suggests this grid is behaving like a complex system. We use 
an R/S analysis to determine the scale of any long time correlation of the outages.
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2.3.2 R/S Analysis
Since we see characteristics of complex systems in our PDF analysis we now want to 
see if there is a long time correlation in the system's outage events. The correlations in 
complex systems between certain sized events can be measured using a Hurst exponent [17], 
[21]-[22]. The slope of this plot is called the Hurst exponent. A Hurst exponent larger than 
0.5 means there is a positive correlation, meaning a blackout at one time may have an effect 
on a blackout that occurs on a later day. In contrast, a Hurst exponent below 0.5 means a 
negative correlation and a Hurst exponent equal to 0.5 shows no correlation.
Figure 2.14: R/S Analysis of Outages Measured by (meters out)x(duration)
In Figure 2.14, we see a Hurst exponent of about 0.78 in the R/S plot which indicates 
a long time correlation. A long time correlation tells us that events happening today are 
affected by events that happened in the past, and similarly, events today will affect future 
events. From the plot we see that this correlation lasts between about 10 days to 3 years.
The power laws from the above section and the long time correlation found here suggest 
the microgrid behaves like a complex system. Because of this we dig deeper into possible 
underlying causes for our outages in the form of looking at the cause codes associated with 
each outage, followed by looking for correlations with the weather.
19
2.3.3 Outages with Different Causes
In our summary of all outages each outage is given a three digit cause code in which the 
first digit gives information on the broad category of the cause and the next two digits give 
more detailed information in the form of subcategories. The categories can be seen in Table 
2.1. In order to determine if certain causes played more of a role than others for particular 
sized outages we next plotted time series and PDFs of the outages split up by cause code.
Table 2.1: Outage Cause Codes
Power Supplier Distribution Planned_Outage Storm Other
Hydro 100 Substation 200 Construction 300 Wind Damage 400 Auto Accident 500
Diesel 101 Substation Fusing or Relay 201 Repairs 301 Water/Snow D 401 Boat Antenna 501
Operation 199 Transformer Bad or Replaced 202 Replacement 302 Line Slap 402 Bed Contact 502
Primary Cable 203 Operations 303 Animal Contact 505
Transformer Fuse or Breaker 204 Damaged Wire -I 503
Secondary Cable or Pedestal 205 Dig In 504
Unknown 666
As one would expect there are some outages that are much more prevalent than others. 
The number of outages due to each cause can be seen in Table 2.2. This difference in outages 
for each cause is taken into account when choosing the bin size of the PDFs. For instance, 
if a cause has less than ten events a bin size of two or three will be chosen rather than the 
usual bin size of ten events per bin. Another thing to be aware of is that less than ten events 
is a very small sample size and it can be hard to get a reliable trend from that amount of 
data.

















100 82 203 105 303 9 502 13
101 148 204 26 400 2 503 5
199 24 205 15 401 12 504 29
200 5 300 15 402 10 Switching
Error
1
201 11 301 91 500 1
202 4 302 68 501 1 666 6
The top causes of outages are “Power Supplier - Diesel”,“Distribution - Primary Cable”, 
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“Planned Outage - Repairs”, “Power Supplier - Hydro”, and “Planned Outage - Replace­
ment”. Because these 5 types of outages make up for about 72% of all outages we will focus 
on those causes to see if any of the trends deviate a significant amount from the total trend. 
This will also help show us if there is a certain cause that relates to more of the smaller or 
larger events than usual.
Figure 2.15: Time Series of Outages Associated with Different Cause Codes (Zoomed in 
below)
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Figure 2.16: PDFs of Outages Associated with Cause Code 101
Figure 2.17: PDFs of Outages Associated with Cause Code 203
The plots in Figures 2.16 and 2.17 are PDFs of the top two unplanned outage causes 
compared with the total outages. The plots include the slopes of both in ranges where they 
appeared similar. The same was done for the remaining top five outage causes and the slopes 
for certain ranges are plotted and then recorded in Table 2.3.
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Table 2.3: Summary of Slopes of PDF Plots for the Top Five Outage Causes
PDFs of top 5 outages compared to total (duration) and one for all other causes of events.
Cause Code Number of Events Range (minutes) Slope
Total 683 7-40 -1.058
101 148 7-40 -1.191
Total 683 17-600 -1.359
203 105 17-600 -1.297
Total 683 5-350 -1.177
301 91 5-350 -0.838
Total 683 6-30 -0.615
100 82 6-30 -0.449
Total 683 7-400 -1.252
302 68 7-400 -0.472
Total 683 14-400 -1.331
All Other Causes 189 14-400 -1.210
Of the top five causes of outages the only one that deviates significantly from the trend 
of the total outages is cause 302 - Planned Outage: Replacement. From the shallow slope of 
the power law in this PDF for this cause we can see that it accounts a higher than average 
percentage of the outages that occur in the duration range near 150-400 minutes. Cause 302 
is a planned outage and is the cause that deviates the most from the total outages, followed 
by cause 301 - Planned Outage: Repairs, another planned outage cause. Because of this, 
we next plot the unplanned and the planned outage PDF, figure 14. From this plot it is 
noticeable that in the middle range (5-300 minutes) the planned outages have a shallower 
slope. In this range it is the planned outages that account for a higher percentage of longer 
outages. However since the unplanned outages PDF extends further out it is these outages 
that account for all outages that last longer than 600 minutes.
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Figure 2.18: PDF of Planned vs Unplanned Outages
Another piece of historical data we have on this system is the fact that all lines were 
buried in 2009 and looked at different outage cause time series with this in mind. Like one 
would expect, this didn't seem to have a noticeable effect on any of the outage causes as 
a whole except the weather related causes. From the chart above we see that the category 
with the 400's cause codes is titled “Storm.” The time series of outages from this category 
only is plotted below in Figure 2.18. On this plot we can see that there are no outages due 
to these cause codes after the year 2009.
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Figure 2.19: Time Series of Outages Caused by Storms
Even though we now know the buried lines protects from outages directly due to storms 
we still look at correlations of the outages with weather. We look still at weather because 
there may be indirect correlations of storms or severe weather that relates to outages. For 
example, extreme high or low temperatures may change normal demands, or large amounts 
of snow may make access to components difficult when it comes to repairs. These things 
would not be labelled as storm related outages even though weather or storms will still have 
an effect.
2.3.4 Weather and Seasonal Correlations
The weather factors we looked at include high winds, floods, blizzards, daily precipitation, 
daily snowfall, and daily temperatures. For each of these factors we plotted time series of the 
outages along with the weather category or categories that we are analyzing. Each condition 
has a plot for duration of events in minutes times the number of meters out. The plots are 
from Jan 1, 2003-Dec 31, 2016. Some of the daily data was marked ‘M' which meant missing 
(sometimes a whole month had ‘M' and sometimes just a day or two); those days were just 
changed to zeros and not plotted. The yellow bars highlight the precipitation and storm 
events that happen the same day (star at top) or the day before (dot at top) an outage 
event. Since there are many events and there is no way to say where the cause and effect lies 
we look at statistics in each of the plots below. Using probabilities we compare the chances 
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of having an outage during certain weather events to the probability of randomly having an 
outage on any given day. There are 682 outage events in 5,114 days; this means that on any 
given day there is about a 13% chance of having an outage event.
2.3.4.1 High Winds
The National Weather Service Instruction PDF defined a high wind storm event as: 
Sustained non-convective winds of 35 knots (40 mph) or greater lasting for 1 hour or longer, 
or gusts of 50 knots (58 mph) or greater for any duration (or otherwise locally/regionally 
defined)[23]. From looking through the data filtered for the Cordova area [20] all wind event 
magnitude values given are the gusts (either measured or estimated) in knots. According to 
NOAA, Cordova falls in the Southeastern Prince William Sound (SERN P.W. SND) Zone, 
so all storm events in the plot (Figure 2.20) are taken from the data on that zone.
Figure 2.20: Time Series of Outages and High Wind Events
There are 59 wind storm events (see above for what qualifies). Of these 59 only 8 are 
on the same day as or the day before an outage event, this is 14%, almost the exact same 
likelihood of having an outage event randomly. Looking at events over 80 knots there are 
14 events and 3 coincide with outage events, 21% which is slightly higher, but given this 
small sample this is very similar to the likelihood of just randomly having an outage event 
on a given day. This indicates that high winds likely do not have an effect on the number of 
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outages. This result is somewhat expected and consistent with the fact that all lines were 
buried underground in 2009.
2.3.4.2 Precipitation and Snowfall
We plotted daily precipitation and daily snowfall together in Figure 2.21. Precipitation 
and snowfall data were found on the UAF GI climate page and there are two stations in 
Cordova, “Cordova North” and “Cordova Airport”, for recording precipitation and snowfall 
[19]. For the plot we used both the “Cordova North” and “Cordova Airport” data and if there 
was a discrepancy in values I took the highest value of precipitation or snowfall on a given 
day and used that as the value. The y-axis on the left side of the plot is the precipitation in 
inches and it starts at 2 inches, assuming 2 inches and less will not have an impact on the 
grid.
Figure 2.21: Time Series of Outages and Daily Precipitation and Snowfall
As with the plot of high wind events, here we also highlighted all precipitation and 
snowfall events above 2 inches that occurred on or one day before an outage event in order 
to see them better. Since there are many precipitation events it is hard to interpret if and 
when these events caused an outage or if they are just coincidental. For precipitation there 
are 211 events over 2 inches and 29 of them coincide with an outage event (about 14%), for 
snowfall there are 225 events over 2 inches and 32 of them coincide with an outage event 
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(about 14%). Alone both of these seem coincidental, but for precipitation it seems there 
may be an effect for very large events.
There is a large outage event on 10/10/2006 with heavy rain the day of and the day 
before that shows up in the flood data as well; this is the largest amount of precipitation 
in the data at just under 12 inches in one day and 8 inches the day before. This suggests 
that extremely heavy rains for two consecutive days will have an effect on the power grid. 
The next largest precipitation events fall in the range of 5-8 inches, for which there are eight 
events and only one is the same day as an outage. This gives 12.5% of events in this range 
coincide with an outage event which is about the same as the chances of having an outage 
event in general; so this is probably just coincidental. For large amounts of snowfall, looking 
only at events that are over 10 inches, there are 23 events and only 2 coincide with outage 
events, 9% which seems just coincidental.
2.3.4.3 Floods and Blizzards
Figure 2.22: Time Series of Outages and Flood and Blizzard Events
From the past 15 years there have been 5 blizzard events and 4 flood events. The website 
does not have information regarding the size of these events, so we just plotted them all 
as either an event occurring or no event occurring. Of the 5 blizzards only one coincided 
with outages and one happened two days before, the other three blizzards were not the same 
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dates as any outage events. Of the 4 floods, 3 of them coincide with an outage event, one 
being a very large outage event which also coincides with a large precipitation event. Even 
though the sample size is small, we think this may indicate that floods are likely to have an 
effect on outages, but blizzards do not seem to. The result of the floods is an interesting 
one, because this seems to be the only storm event that may still affect the grid even though 
the lines are buried.
2.3.4.4 Temperature
When looking at temperature data points, if any days had an ‘M' (which indicated missing 
data) we changed those to be the same as the day before so we could still plot everything. 
Figure 19, below, shows the plot of the high and low temperature along with the duration 
of all outage events.
Figure 2.23: Time Series of Outages and Daily High and Low Temperatures
We saw a slight correlation with warmer temperatures. We believe this may be caused 
by the fish processing plants that only operate in the summer and thus increase the load 




Also looking at temperature and precipitation we plotted events when it rained while the 
low was less than 32 degrees Fahrenheit assuming this would result in freezing rain. From 
this we found 23 times where this happened and only 3 that correspond with an outage for 
about 13%. So we found no link between cold temperatures and rain either. We also looked 
at different snow depths to see if that had an effect on the duration of outages assuming that 
it may be more difficult to get to wires for repairs if snow is too deep, but this also seemed 
to have no effect.
2.3.5.1 Correlation of Outages with Load Demand
The most telling metric we have used is comparing the outages with the load demand. 
We have the hourly load usage data (in MW) for the years 2005-2017 and the outage data for 
the years 2003-2017 for the 5 main feeders: Auxiliary, New Town, Main Town, Lake Avenue, 
and 13 Mile. We analyzed this data by plotting a time series of the load data and the outage 
data on each feeder to compare the two and were able to both estimate an average trend in 
the load data as well as zoom in on each outage to determine whether the outage happened 
during a peak demand time or not.
When plotting each feeder's load demand individually there are noticeable trends in the 
load demand that differ. It can also be seen in these plots that there was a major reconfig­
uration of the lines in 2013 causing some of the trends to change. The most immediately 
noticeable trend is that Auxiliary feeder has a peak demand in the summer and this is prob­
ably due to the fact that this feeder goes to the fish processing locations. This trend is also 
very noticeable in the Main Town feeder after the line reconfiguration in 2013. When zoom­
ing into the plots closer, the 13 Mile, Lake Avenue, Main Town, and New Town feeders all 
seem to have a daily cycle that peaks during the day, highest in the morning near 8am-noon 
and evening near 5-8pm and is at a low during the night near 10pm-6am. All feeders have 
slight peaks during the summer, but not as much as the Auxiliary and Main Town feeders.
To see an average year, in Figure 2.24 are the loads (in MW) on all feeders combined for 
2014. In Figure 2.25 the average daily load demand cycle is shown.
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When counting the outages that occurred during the day we assumed the day time peak 
was around 8am-10pm. When counting the outages during the summer time peak load 
demand we assumed that fell between mid-June until mid-September. We used these times 
and dates to analyze the outages, specifically the percentage of outages that took place during 
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a daily peak, a nightly lull, and a summer time peak compared with the percentage of outages 
that would happen in those times if outages were happening randomly. The total tally for 
the number of outages can be seen in Table 2.4 below. Along with total outages we also 
looked at the amount of different sized outages (small, medium, large) during each period in 
terms of number of meters out, duration of outages in minutes, and (meters out)x(duration).
All outages, in terms of (meters out)x(duration) are plotted below in Figure 2.26. From 
this plot, we arbitrarily chose values to be cutoff values for the ranges of small, medium, and 
large outages. They are defined as:
• Small: less than 5,000
• Medium: between 5,000 and 15,000
• Large: greater than 15,000
The amount of small, medium, large, and total outages during each part of the load 
demand cycle are recorded in Table 2.4.
Figure 2.26: Time Series of Outages Measured by Meters Out × Duration in Minutes
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Table 2.4: Summary of Probabilities of Outages During Different Points in Load Demand 
Cycle Measured by Meters Out× Duration in Minutes
In Table 2.4, when looking at total outages, we can see a clearly higher percentage of 
outages that happen during the summer than we would expect if outages were just happening 
randomly. There is also a slightly higher amount of outages that occur in the daytime than 
we would expect from them randomly happening, but the percentage is not much higher and 
this could just be due to chance. Because the yearly fluctuations in load demand are much 
more drastic, this suggests a correlation with more outages during higher load demand times 
which is expected.
This same process is repeated twice more except this time we are measuring the outages 
in terms of duration in minutes and then energy unserved. Below in Figure 2.27 is the plot 
of the outages in terms of duration in minutes. From here we chose the following values to 
represent small, medium, and large outages:
• Small: Less than 30 minutes
• Medium: Between 30 minutes and 120 minutes
• Large: Greater than 120 minutes (2 hours)
We chose these values based on the outages in the plot along with our own opinions on 
what we would consider to be a large, medium, or small outage.
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Figure 2.27: Time Series of Outages Measured by Duration in Minutes
Table 2.5: Summary of Probabilities of Outages During Different Points in Load Demand
Cycle Measured by Duration in Minutes
For energy unserved we chose the following values for small, medium, and large outages 
based on the distribution of sizes in the time series.
• Small: less than 5 MW*min.
Medium: 5-30 MW*min.
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• Large: greater than 30 MW*min.
Table 2.6: Summary of Probabilities of Outages During Different Points in Load Demand
Cycle Measured by Energy Unserved
One interesting thing that is seen here when loads are split up by size is that there are 
less large outages during the day and more during the night. Since the planned outages are 
filtered out already, this could possibly be due to a faster response time and/or more people 
working on the issue during the day. There is also a very large percentage of small outages 
that happen during the daytime peak in load demand. When comparing the tables using 
the two different measurements of outage we can see that the outages that happen during 
the nighttime lull tend to be much longer in duration.
Since the summer peak here is defined by mid-June to mid-September the probability 
of randomly having outages that fall in this time frame would be 3/12 or 25%. The actual 
percentage of outages that fall in this range is just over 40%. Since we have 13 years of data 
this is enough to say that there is a significant amount more outages in the summer time. 
There are some years, such as 2016, which we know to be a low fish processing year (i.e. 
lower summertime demand) that had a lower percentage of outages in the summer. This 
helps reinforce our assumption that the higher demand in the summer, even if it is only on 
one or two feeders, leads to more outages overall during this time. This result is consistent 
with what we found when plotting the PDFs of the summer outages and winter outages 
(Figures 2.12 and 2.13).
For most days the daytime peak in the daily cycle falls around 7am-10pm. With this 
assumption/average the probability of an outage randomly falling in this time frame would 
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be 15/24 or 62.5%. The actual percentage of outages that fall during this time frame is 65%. 
While this is slightly higher than what random would predict, it is not a lot higher. Since 
there is 13 years of data I think this slight increase may be meaningful, but is not quite as 
significant as the summertime peak in load demand.
Between the greatly increased amount of outages in the summer and the slightly increased 
amount of outages in the day time, we can conclude that higher demands lead to a slightly 
higher chance of an outage. With this knowledge we look into the difference in outage size 
distribution at different times during the annual and daily cycles using slopes from PDFs. 
A summary of the results from the PDFs in terms of energy unserved (see section b) are 
shown in Table 2.7 below.
Table 2.7: Summary of Slopes of PDFs of Outages Measured by Energy Unserved During 







Before Lines Buried -0.892
After Lines Buried -0.888
These results are consistent with what was found in Tables 2.4 - 2.6 above. There are 
more large outages occurring at night and during the summer. Because the change in load 
demand in summer vs winter is much more drastic than the difference between day vs night 
we take the summer vs winter result to be more significant in terms of the effect of load 
demand on outages.
2.3.6 Risk
The reason for doing much of the above analysis on the system is to get a better idea 
behind what threatens the system in terms of outages, especially large outages, on the power 
grid the most. By becoming more aware of the factors surrounding a higher or lower than 
average amount of outages occurring one can have a better idea of where and how to make 
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the grid more resilient. To quantify this we have come up with a risk metric that measures 
the risk to the grid during a certain time period compared to an opposing time period.
First we compare the risk in the summer when there is a peak in the power demand vs the 
risk in the winter when there is no peak in the power demand (See figure 20a. plot of average 
yearly cycle at the beginning of the previous subsection). Risk is calculated using probability 
of a certain event happening, P, and the estimated cost of that event [18]. Estimated cost 
is the approximated power demand that is not met because of the outage multiplied by the 
duration of the outage. These points are plotted on a log-log plot (see appendix section c) 
and then a single risk value, R, is found by integrating this plot and taking this value times 
the frequency of an event occurring. The value for R does not have an upper limit, but rather 
gives a single numerical interpretation of risk meant to allow a simple comparison between 
two numbers to understand the difference in risk between two different periods in time. A 
higher value for R represents a larger risk for the time period in question. The equations to 
obtain R are as follows:
Where the probability of events in bin i is calculated the same as it is in the PDF. When 
comparing winter and summer, the results for the risk index were what we expected; the 
summer had a much larger value for risk index than winter as shown in Table 2.8.
Table 2.8: Risk Index Values for Summer vs Winter
Using the same methods of calculating values as above, we then calculated and plotted 





or not this had an effect on the risk of an outage occurring. We see in Table 2.9 below that 
the lines being buried results in a much lower risk.
Table 2.9: Risk Index Values for Before vs After all the Lines were Buried Underground
We then combined the above two comparisons and looked at risk in the summer vs winter 
for both before and after the lines were buried. These risk values are listed in Table 2.10.




Before Burying 2.305 0.747
After Burying 1.171 0.679
Our results were consistent with above, risk was highest in the summer before the lines 
were buried and lowest in the winter after the lines were buried. From this we see that the 
system benefited from burying the lines and also that the system is less at risk of an outage 
when the load demand is lower.
2.4 Conclusions
This microgrid seems to behave similarly to larger grids. It exhibits power law behavior 
that suggests self-organized criticality within the system. This tells us that larger events 
tend to dominate the risk in this grid.
This system has a higher energy demand in the summer than the winter which can be 
attributed to the fish processing that occurs during these months. Due to the high energy 
demand in the summer we notice a higher risk in the system in the summer compared to the 





significantly after the year 2009 which was when all of the lines were buried underground; 
this burial of the cables also resulted in an elimination of outages due to weather events.
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3 General Conclusion
The microgrid in Cordova shows similar behavior to what is typical of larger grids that 
have been researched. Using multiple different measures of outage size, it displays power 
laws in the distribution of its outages. This tells us that large outages happen more often 
than expected and thus play a dominating role in the distribution of outages by size.
After getting an idea of the distribution of all outages we separated outages based on the 
cause of the outage. Broadly, we separated by planned and unplanned outages. Through 
this we found that although the unplanned outages accounted for some of the largest outages 
we saw, the planned outages held more weight in the amount of larger outages; i.e. the PDF 
of planned outages had a noticeably shallower slope than the PDF of the unplanned outages.
Even though we found storms to be on the lower end of the causes of outages we decided 
to next correlate outages with various weather events thinking that severe weather may 
still have an indirect effect on the grid such as through something like longer repair time 
for an outage. We looked at events such as high winds, daily and heavy precipitation, 
snowfall and more, and found little correlation. This lack of correlation with things like 
high winds, blizzards, etc. was somewhat expected due to the all of the lines being buried 
underground in 2009. The only severe weather event with potential correlation to outages 
would be flooding, where we found that 75% of the time that there was a flood there was 
also an outage. However, there were only 4 occurrences of flooding in the 15 years we were 
looking at so it is hard to tell from this small of a sample size. We were surprised that when 
comparing outages with the temperature we saw a larger portion of outages occurring when 
there were higher temperatures. Then we looked at the annual power demand and saw a 
large increase in power demand in the summer.
Since there is a much higher demand in power over the summer, due to the fish pro­
cessing that occurs in Cordova, we attributed the larger portion of outages during higher 
temperatures to this. We also noticed a daily cycle in the load demand, but this was much 
less dramatic than the seasonal cycle. In the daily power demand cycle the demand at the 
bottom of this daily cycle in the summer was still much higher than the top of the peak 
demand in this cycle throughout the rest of the year. Due to this we saw much more dis­
crepancy in the frequency of outages that occurred during the summer versus the rest of the 
year than we did in the daily demand cycle and so the seasonal cycle became our main focus.
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Since we found a difference in the portion of outages that fell in the summer versus the 
rest of the year we decided to look deeper into that and split outages up by size (small, 
medium, large). We found that when using the measure of meters down times duration 
that slightly more of the summer time outages were of large and medium size, when using 
the measure of duration more of the outages were medium and small, and when using the 
energy unserved measure most of the outages were by far large outages. This tells us that 
outages are much more likely to occur when power demand is high and also tells us that 
these outages at these high demand times in the summer were able to be resolved slightly 
faster than average.
All of the conclusions above helped us form our risk index for the system and helped us 
determine what time frames to compare when looking at different risk values. The risk index 
showed us that the risk of the system having an outage is higher in the summer, when the 
load demand is highest, than it is during the rest of the year. The risk index also showed us 
that the risk of the system having an outage was higher before the lines were all buried in 
2009 than after. This is consistent with what we thought would happen and it now gives us 
an index/value to quantify just how much different the risk is. We see that after the lines 
were buried the risk in the summer was nearly cut in half where the risk in the winter only 
went down by about 10%. The risk index provides an easy to interpret, single number scale 
for comparing risk to different areas of the grid and different time frames.
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5 Appendices
5.1 PDFs - Fixed Bins
The PDF is created when we sort and group the different sizes of outages and plot them 
to determine the probability of having an outage of a particular size. To sort and group 
elements we want to put similar sized events together in the same bin and then each bin will 
be plotted with the average event size on the x-axis and the frequency that an event fell in 
that particular category on the y-axis. To do this, there are two ways to define a bin; a fixed 
bin and a variable bin. In the analysis above the variable bin method is always used.
A fixed bin takes in the number of bins desired, N , and divides them all up to be equally 
sized. With fixed bins, some bins might have no events in them and some might have many 
events in them. With this method, it is important to choose an appropriate N that describes 
the whole PDF well. If N is chosen to be too large, there tend to be many bins with zero 
or one event in them as we get to the larger and rarer event sizes. If N is chosen to be too 
small this may cause a loss of information for the smaller, more probable events. In some 
cases it could be that there is not one value for N that provides adequate information for 
both ends of the PDF and this is where the variable bin method can provide a better option.
The second method, variable binning, results in a non-uniform bin size. This method 
sets the size of the bin to be based on the number of events in the bin, n. Once a value for 
n is chosen the smallest n events will be placed in the first bin and that bin size is set as the 
largest value in that bin divided by 2. Then the next n events will be placed in the next bin 
and the size of that bin is set by the largest value in that bin minus the largest value in the 
previous bin and that difference is divided by two. This continues until all events are placed 
in a bin. There will be one main instance when there will be more than n events in a bin, 
that is when n events have been placed in a bin and the size of the largest event in that bin is 
the same value as the next largest event. In this case, since the values are indistinguishable 
it would not make sense to separate them and because of this they are placed in the same 
bin and the number of events for that particular bin will be larger than n. This process 
takes place until the next largest number in the array is distinguishable from the largest in 
the bin. When plotting the variable bin assortment the bin sizes are shown on the x-axis 
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and the number of events in each bin divided by the bin size multiplied by total events is on 
the y-axis. Commonly throughout this paper we choose n = 10, unless we are dealing with 
a very small number of events where n = 10 does not provide enough data.
5.2 CDF and CCDF
The Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) is the integral of the PDF. For the discrete 
case here the plot is constructed by taking the sum of all points smaller than the point that 
is being calculated. The PDF is a probability function so the integral of the entire function 
must be one, because of this fact the CDF must asymptote to one.
From the CDF the Complimentary Cumulative Distribution Function (CCDF) can be 
formed by taking one minus the CDF.
The CCDF plots for both summer and winter are shown.
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Figure 5.2: CCDF Plot for Outages that Occur in Winter
Below are the plots of the CCDF functions for before and after the lines were buried:
Figure 5.3: CCDF Plot for Outages that Occur Before Lines were Buried
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Figure 5.4: CCDF Plot for Outages that Occur After Lines were Buried
where G(t) is one array and F (t) is the other array. All values in array G and array F have 
been averaged and then that average is subtracted from all values in the array. This equation 
shows that array G will be stationary, while array F will be the array that is shifting values 
to correlate.
Cross correlation can be used in two ways. One way is to determine if there is any 
meaningful periodic correlation between two sets of data. This will appear as a pattern 
when enough shifts (value of τ ) are shown in the plot. For example, a yearly correlation 
might be seen after plotting about three or more years worth of tau values. The second
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5.3 Autocorrelation and Cross Correlation
Cross correlating two sets/arrays of data shows how related the two sets are in terms of 
a value from -1.0 to +1.0, where +1.0 means perfectly correlated and -1.0 means perfectly 
anticorrelated. For each set of data the value for which correlation/anticorrelation would be 
considered significant differs and depends on the level of noise in the set. To cross correlate 
two sets of data use the following function:
is to determine potential causation. This is seen when looking closely at daily shifts near 
the center of the plot, around τ equal to -5 to +5 days. If there is a significant peak at, 
for example, +2 this tells us that perhaps whatever is happening today in array G could 
be caused by an event that happened two days ago in array F , and vice versa for negative 
numbers.
In our case, tau is the shift in days and will go from -5,114 to +5,114 before the data 
starts repeating because we have 15 years worth of data. Plotting the cross correlation of 
two functions can be done in two ways, one way is to shift one set of data by one day for 
each point until there are only two points left to correlate, this sometimes causes the ends 
to look strange as there are very few data points left to correlate the two functions. The 
second way is to wrap the data points back around after shifting them, this method we have 
labelled as “(Wrapping Array Values)” under the title of each plot in order to differentiate 
what method was used. However, this shouldn't make much of a difference because the 
important correlations will be seen closer to the middle which will look almost identical for 
the two methods. We look primarily at the middle because when dealing with things like 
weather correlations once we are a week or two away from a weather event there is almost 
no chance that any correlation seen between that event and an outage will be meaningful 
at all. Autocorrelating a set of data is the same as cross correlating except the second data 
set is the same as the first; this can show any periodicities in a set of data being looked at. 
When autocorrelating a function the time lag of τ = 0 should always have a value of 1.0 
meaning perfectly correlated. This is because when the data sets are being compared with 
no shift they will be identical for autocorrelation.
The autocorrelation for the outage data is shown below. The outage data is the array 
of values for outages in terms of meters affected times duration in minutes. In order to get 
the array of outage data to be the same length as the weather data, and to keep time lags 
consistently one day, I took the largest event on a given day if there was more than one 
event that fell on a particular day. From the plots there is a +1.0 correlation for τ = 0 and 
then it falls to a value of around +0.02 after one shift and then fluctuates around -0.01 to 
+0.2 for the rest of the time. Because the ends get a little inaccurate I zoomed in to get 
plots of the middle 1/3 shifts each way (about -2,000 to +2,000). It appears that most of the 
plot is just noise, indicating that the outages do not have an effect on each other from one 
day to the next and there is also no noticeable periodicity to the outages. This result of 
not seeing any outages affecting another might be expected for a system of this size. This is 
because any cascading failures that occur will likely occur in the same day and be resolved 
that day as well. This analysis would not pick that up because the time shift is a whole day 
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and therefore doesn't go into fine enough detail to pick up outages that effect each other in 
the same day.
Figure 5.5: Autocorrelation of Outages Values
Figure 5.6: Autocorrelation of Outages Values Zoomed In
Following the autocorrelation, we cross correlated the outages with the daily high tem­
peratures and found a slight seasonal correlation, shown in Figure 5.7. The plot is done 
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with outages being the first array, G, and daily high temperatures being array F , shifted by 
the values indicated on the x-axis. There is periodicity in the plots with the values going 
between -0.04 to +0.04. The plot shows a trend/periodicity which indicates a correlation 
with the changing seasons.
Figure 5.7: Cross Correlation Between Outages and Daily High Temperatures
Next, we cross correlated the outages (in number of meters affected times duration in 
minutes) with other weather events. Shown in Figures 5.8 through 5.11 are the correlation 
plots for daily precipitation and snowfall. Wind storms, floods, and blizzards were all cross 
correlated too, but due to the small number of data points there was no meaningful result 
from this method of analysis. In both cases shown below the array of outages is what is 
being shifted (amount of shift is given on x-axis). In all cases we show a plot zoomed into 
about the middle 1/5 of all shifts and then zoom in closer to see the behavior around zero.5
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Figure 5.8: Cross Correlation Between Outages and Daily Precipitation - Middle 1/3 Values
Figure 5.9: Cross Correlation Between Outages and Daily Precipitation - Zoomed In Further
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Figure 5.10: Cross Correlation Between Outages and Daily Snowfall - Middle 1/3 Values
Figure 5.11: Cross Correlation Between Outages and Daily Snowfall - Zoomed In Further
There appears to be slight seasonal periodicity in both plots which may just be due to 
the seasonal periodicity of snow and rain. When looking at the center-most points we can 
see peaks, but these peaks don't go above the level of correlation that would be considered 
noise in these plots, so we cannot say anything about these other than the rain and snow do 
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not appear to have an effect on the outages.
5.4 Outages Separated by Feeder
To further look into the duration PDF I split up events based on which feeder they were 
a part of. Then I plotted each feeder's events with the total events in one PDF (distribution) 
to compare them. I used a variable bin size with n = 10 events for the total (all events) and 
anywhere from n = 2, 3, 4, 5 events for each individual feeder, depending on the number of 
events associated with each feeder. In these PDFs the events that occur at the same time 
are not combined because I am looking at the different feeders.
The number of events for each feeder is:
• Auxiliary - 90 • HBC - 58 New Town - 194
13 Mile - 176 Lake Avenue - 174 Power Creek - 0
Main Town - 84 Total - 837• Express - 61
Figure 5.12: PDF Of All Feeders Individually Figure 5.14: PDF of 13 Mile Feeder (n=3)
Figure 5.13: PDF of Main Town Feeder Out-
ages Figure 5.15: PDF of 13 Mile Feeder (n=5)
Outages
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Figure 5.16: PDF of New Town Feeder (n=3)
Outages Figure 5.20: PDF of Humpback Creek Feeder
Outages
Figure 5.21: PDF of Auxiliary Feeder Out-
Figure 5.19: PDF of Lake Ave Feeder (n=5) 
Outages
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From Figures 5.12-5.22 it seems that all of the PDFs of the individual feeders share the 
same shape (at least roughly) as the PDF of all events. From this I would think the abnormal 
shape of the plot near 20-30 minutes is not due to a particular feeder.
5.5 Cascading Failures
Cascading failures of unplanned outages are listed in Table 5.1. I counted the failure as 
cascading if a second (or more) failure occurred on another feeder before the first was fixed.
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Table 5.1: Potential Cascading Failures
Date Line start Time End Time cause Num. of Unes
8/14/2003 New Town 3:03 PM 3:19 PM Power Supplier Hydro SJl
13 Mile 3:20 PM 3:23 PM Power Supplier Hydro 226
12∕27∕2004 New Town 3:58 AM 5:48 AM Storm Water/Snow Damage 531
H Mile 5.47 AM 6:27 AM Storm Water/Snow Damage 226
New Town 2:15 PM 2:50 PM Storm Line Step 10
New Town 2:29 PM 2:30 PM Distributer Transformer Fuse 117
6/25/2006 New Town 2:16 PM 2:44 PM Power Supplier Hydro 551
Lake Avenue 2:22 PM 2:41 PM Power Supplier Hydro 430
Main Town 2:26 PM 2:44 PM Power Supplier Hydro 317
7∕3/2006 Lake Avenue 7:39 PM 7:52 PM Power Supplier Hyrim 430
New Town 7:40 PM 732 PM Power Supplier Hydro 531
12/11/2006 Lake Avenue 3:36 PM 3:47 PM Power Supplier Diesel 430
New Town 3:39 PM 3:48 PM Power Supplier Diesel 531
5/6∕2008 13 Mile 10:06 PM 10:30 PM Power Supplier Diesel 226
New Town 10:14 PM 10:30 PM Power Supplier Diesel 531
Lake Avenue 10:14 PM 10:30 PM Power Supplier Diesel 430
Main Town 10:14 PM 10:30 PM Power Supplier Diesel 317
5∕15∕200β New Town 3:47 PM 4:12 PM Distribution Primary Cable 531
Main Town 2.58 PM 4:11 PM Distribution Primary Cable 317
8∕25∕2008 Lake Aven 1:17 PM 1:44 PM Distribution Primary Cable 430
13 Mile 1:21 PM 1:45 PM Distribution Primary Cable 225
New Town 1:22 PM 1:44 PM Distribution Primary Cable 551
9/11/2009 13 Mile 1:00 AM 1:56 AM Power Supplier Hydro 225
New Tnwn 1:38 AM 1:56 AM Power Supplier Hydro 531
5/17/2011 Auxiliary 3:33 PM 3:37 PM Distribution Primary Cable 104
Express 3:33 PM 3:37 PM Distribution Primary Cable 0
New Town 3:33 PM 3:38 PM Distribution Primary Cable 531
Lake Aven 3:33 PM 3:37 PM Distribution Primary Cable 430
Main Tower 3:33 PM 3:43 PM Distribution Primary Cable 317
13 Mile 3:33 PM 3:43 PM Distribution Primary Cable 226
Auxiliary 3:39 PM 3:40 PM Dislribution Primary Cable 104
Express 3:39 PM 3:41 PM Distribution Primary Cable 0
New Town 3:39 PM 3:41 PM Distribution Primary Cable 531
lake Avenue 3:39 PM 3:41 PM Distribution Primary Cable 4 30
7/14/2012 H Mile 4:12 PM 4:59 PM Power Supplier Operations 265
HBC 4:12 PM 4:28 PM Power Supplier Operations 5
New Town 4.15 PM 4:58 PM Power Supplier Operations 531
Lake Aven 4:28 PM 4:55 PM Power Supplier Operations 430
10/19/2012 Main Town 11:07 PM 12.47 AM Distribution Primary Cable 317
10/20/2012 Express 12:41AM 12:47 AM Distribution Primary Cable 0
New Town 12 41 AM 12:49 AM Distribution Primary Cable 351
Lake Avenue 12:41 AM 12:49 AM Distribution Primary Cable 430
13 Mile 12 41 AM 12:49 AM Distribution Primary Cable 226
3/11/2014 HBC 9:31AM 9:37 AM Power Supplier Operations 5
Mam Towr 9.31AM 9:37 AM Power Supplier Operations 317
New Town 9:31 AM 9.38 AM Power SuppIier Operations 531
Lake Aven 9 31AM 9.39 AM Power Supplier Operation 430
13 Mile 9 31 AM 9:38 AM Power Supplier Operations 225
Auxiliary 9:33 AM 9:36 AM Power Supplier Operations 104
Express 9:33 AM 9:35 AM Power Supplier Operations 0
4/17/2016 13 Mile 1:06 PM 1:30 AM DirtriBution Primary Cable 33
13 Mile 1:08 PM 4:54 PM Distribution Primary Cable 32
13 Mile 1:08 PM 5:38 PM Distribution Primary Cable 91
13 Mile 1:08 PM 8:30 PM Distribution Primary Cable 15
New Town 1:16 PM 1:46 PM Distribution Primary Cable 531.
13 Mile 11:00 PM 1:30 AM Dtstribution Primary Cable 172
10/3/2016 New Town 12:35 AM 1:13 AM Distribution Primary CAble 531
13 Mile 12 35 AM 2.22 AM Distribution Primary Cable 220
HBC 12:36 AM 1:21 AM Distribution Primary Cable 5
Lake Avenue 12:43 AM 1:05 AM Distribution Primary Cable 430
Main Town 12:48 AM 1:13 AM Distribution Primary Cable 317
2/14/2017 Auxiliary 9 40 AM 9.46 AM Power Supplier Hydro 104
HBC 9:40 AM 9:49 AM Power Supplier Hydro 5
Main Town 9.40 AM 9:48 AM Power Supplier Hydro 317
Lake Avenue 9:40 AM 9:47 AM Power Supplier Hyrim 430
13 Mile 9 40 AM 9:46 AM Power SuppIier Hydro 226
New Town 9:41 AM 9:48 AM Power Supplier Hydro 531
7/14/2017 13 Mile 10:50 AM 11:01 AM Power supplier Hydro 226
Auxiliary 10:50 AM 11:05 AM Power Supplier Hydro 104
HBC 10:50 AM 11:05 AM Power Supplier Hydro S
Main Town 10:50 AM 11:03 AM Power Supplier Hydro 317
New Town 10:55 AM 11:02 AM Power Supplier Hydra 531
Lake Aven 10:55 AM 11:01AM Power Supplier Hydro 430
9/4/2017 HBC 9:10 AM 10:04 AM Power Supplier Diesel 5
Main Town 9:11 AM 10:08 AM Power Supplier Diesel 317
Uke Aven 9:11 AM 10:24 AM Power SuppIier Diesel 430
13 Mile 9:11 AM 10:19 AM Power Supplier Diesel 226
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Table 5.2 is a table of the different causes of cascading and total outages and the per­
centages of each.




Hydro 6 33.33% 85 16.28%
Diesel 3 16.67% 154 29.50%
Operations 2 11.11% 30 5.75%
Distribution
Substation 0 0.00% 5 0.96%
Substation Fusing or Rela 0 0.00% 9 1.72%
Transformer Bad or Repl≡ 0 0.00% 3 0.57%
Primary Cable 6 33.33% 112 21.46%
Transformer Fuse or Brea 0.33 1.83% 28 5.36%
Secondary Cable or Pede 0 0.00% 15 2.87%
Storm
Wind 0 0.00% 2 0.38%
Water∕Snow 0.33 1.83% 12 2.30%
Line Slap 0.33 1.83% 10 1.92%
Other 0 0.00% 57 10.92%
Total 18 522
There were a total of 18 cascading failures from unplanned outages. A majority of 
the cascading failures were due to “Power Supplier - Hydro” and “Distribution - Primary 
Cable.”
5.6 Earthquakes
There were 130 earthquakes of size 4.0 or larger near Cordova in the last 100 years. 
Looking at the time series of these earthquakes it was clear that the equipment before the 
mid 1970's was not as good. From looking at the data it appears that only size 5.5 or larger 
earthquakes were recorded before then, and possibly only 6.5 and larger was recorded before 
the mid 1960's. Because of this we only used earthquakes after 1973 for our analysis.
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Earthquakes Near Cordova - Timeseries
Figure 5.23: Time Series of Earthquakes Near Cordova
Figure 5.24: PDF of Earthquakes
58
Figure 5.25: CCDF of Earthquakes
There appears to be a power law for the events of about size 4.0-5.5 in the CCDF.
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